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Abstract 
For many people “solidarity” has become a meaningless word used in slogans 
– too often used without leading to any economic consequences. We show in 
this paper conditions under which solidarity can be a powerful instrument. In 
a solidary action, an individual in a group contributes to a series of actions 
that aims for a reallocation of scarce resources. The willingness to contribute 
is mainly influenced by the efficiency of the objective of the solidary action, 
and is enhanced by feelings of mutual exchange (solidarity) within a group.  
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I  Introduction 
Calls  to  “behave  in  solidarity”  are  often  ignored.  However,  commitments  to  solidarity  have 
drastically changed societies – in many instances a matter of life or death. Gide (1987) records: 
to contend with the Nile floods, Egypt’s inhabitants mutually cooperated in labor and cultivation. 
The struggle against the uncontrollable power of nature led individuals into solidarity. 
 What is “solidarity”? By lay definitions, it is an “implicit agreement of many individuals as 
of a group. [It calls for] complete unity as of opinion, purpose and interest” (Webster’s (1980))”. 
St. Paul suggests, “We are all members of one body”. In this stride, the School of Solidarity’s 
doctrine states: this growing interdependence of commitment between individuals and peoples is 
a harmonic law1; the solution of the social question must be sought in the continual development 
of solidarity, especially in cooperation in all its forms.2  
Hechter (1987), amongst other sociologists, asserts that individuals’ actions are decisively 
affected by the groups to which they belong. Several different approaches to group solidarity are 
provided in the sociological literature – many of which focus on groups rather than individuals. 
According to Hechter (1987, p. 39), “[a] group is solidary to the degree that its members comply 
with corporate rules in the absence of compensation.” Hechter further argues that “each of the 
principal sociological approaches to the problem of group solidarity is inadequate”, since they 
“fail to explain how public goods (like social order) are produced” when potential contributors 
have the chance to free ride. 
On the other hand, in economic literature, “solidarity” is used in an ad hoc fashion with no 
agreement  on  a  clear  definition.  Compare  and  contrast  the  following  two  cases,  both  from 
experimental studies. Selten and Ockenfels (1998) claim that “subjects can show solidarity in the 
sense that they are willing to help others who by chance came to a much worse position than 
they themselves”. Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988), however, measure “solidarity” as the 
difference between contributions to a social good benefiting the own group (of contributors), and 
contributions to a (different) social good benefiting others. 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2003) provide a restrictive but insightful definition of solidarity. 
They define “s-solidarity” as an act directed towards a “target group”, when the following four 
conditions  apply.  I:  (personality-invariance)  the  personality  of  target  group  members  cannot 
influence the solidary act. II: (condition-specificity) the target group is identified solely on the 
basis of an unfavorable condition. III: (belief-irrelevance) such acts cannot be motivated by the 
desire to impress others or conform to their expectations. IV: (non-instrumentality) it must not be 
                                                 
1 Tan and Zizzo (2003) reviews experimental evidence on how such harmony may  be measured based on the 
interdependence of payoffs, and how payoff transformations may be explained by an inducement of common fate. 
2 Typical objections of individualistic approaches to this doctrine are that ‘the only solidarity discoverable in the 
world is that of mutual exploitation’ and that this doctrine is in opposition to competition - the basis of economic 




performed in expectation of reaping future personal benefits. They further define “radical r-
solidarity” as a consistent or an evolutionary consequence of a series of interactions between 
benefactor and beneficiary, when the beneficiary is subject to the social power of the benefactor. 
These definitions are intuitively appealing. But, they are not by themselves instructive as to 
what solidarity can do. When is it a powerful instrument? What process implements it? What 
conditions influence solidary actions? What results from it? It is therefore useful to develop a 
framework of solidarity. Nevertheless, our analysis essentially considers these definitions. 
 
This paper is motivated by anecdotal evidence. We infer, from a set of historical facts, a 
substantively significant relationship between socio-economic conditions, observed actions and 
outcomes. These observations are neither a collection of unexplainable phenomena, nor are their 
explanations based on disjoint concepts. History teaches us that solidarity: i) is motivated by 
emotions; ii) requires collective action; iii) must have consistent objectives and outcomes; iv) 
evolves  and  disappears;  v)  differs  when  voluntary  or  involuntary,  and;  vi)  depends  on  who 
benefits  from  it.  A  typology  of  economic  concepts  organizes  the  salient  features  of  each 
historical  account.  In  turn,  these  economic  concepts  may  be  comprehended  in  unison  as 
“solidarity”.  
Our analysis adopts a decision theoretic approach. Here, solidarity is a dynamic concept. It is 
a  process  of  mutual  exchange,  powered  by  emotion  (in  particular,  altruism).  Put  simply, 
solidarity is a series of collective actions3. For collective action to be taken, individuals must be 
sufficiently motivated to depart from selfishness. Collective action is a necessary condition for 
“solidarity”. By no means is it a sufficient condition.  
Other conditions are required to sustain4 and/or promote solidarity. First, the consequence of 
a solidarity movement must be consistent with its intended target (e.g., social efficiency). Next, it 
makes a difference if solidary actions are induced voluntarily or involuntarily. Solidarity depends 
also on whether its benefits accrue to those within or outside of the group, and the relations 
between  them.  Solidarity  can  vary  with  group  sizes.  We  expound  on  this  below,  by  first 
describing these concepts, and then linking them using a formal model. 
The explanation we offer in this paper is derived from the statement of solidarity as “a matter 
of life or death”. It explains any rise and fall of solidarity actions. If we interpret “life and death” 
in today’s context, the closest approximation might be social efficiency. We show that, under 
certain conditions, the probability of a solidary action increases with its efficiency. In turn, as 
soon as the efficacy of the action decreases, the solidarity movement loses support. In addition, 
                                                 
3 That is, acting on decisions made as a collective unit (c.f. Etzioni, 1988). Our paper therefore investigates the 
robustness of collective decisions, as manifested in the actions of the members of the collective. 
4 See for e.g. Hechter (1987) who offers a new theory on the question how to sustain solidarity.  4 
 
 
we will show that solidarity vanishes in a world where people are no longer dependent on one 
another,  i.e.  where  fewer  socially  efficient  actions  are  possible.  Our  approach  departs  from 
earlier approaches taking solidary behavior as a given necessity – sustained by different kind of 
coercive policies. Instead, we endogenize the reason to behave in solidarity.  
 
Section II presents the anecdotal evidence. We discuss its relevance, and motivate a clarified 
theme  of  solidarity.  Section  III translates  the  connotations  from  the  anecdotal  evidence  into 
economic concepts. They serve as building blocks for an economic model of solidarity. Section 
IV presents a dynamic utility function for a general class of solidarity games. It allows us to 
explain the conditions for an individual to contribute to a solidarity action. Section V concludes.  
 
II  Evidence and Motivation 
A. Evidence from solidarity movements 
Communism  and  Liberalism.  History  shows  that  due  to  its  necessity,  solidarity  gradually 
becomes institutionalized. Examples include co-operatives built over the last centuries to share 
common properties or tools amongst members. Such institutions culminated in the 20th century 
to the enlarged civil, public and social order of a society. Within these social rules, modern 
liberalism promotes “everyone for himself” as a central behavioral concept. At the turn of the 
21st  century  there  was,  therefore,  an  increasing  number  of  “pop-liberals”  who  doubted  the 
necessity to pay any attention to a word on which the entire doctrine of their strongest antagonist, 
the communist society, was based on. 
Solidarity, in the sense of “one for all and all for one”, is a conflicting precept. In communist 
societies, solidarity was desired between the communist party and the working class. The target 
of this unity was to realize the “historic mission” of “outrunning without overtaking the capitalist 
society”. Leading ideologists proposed that solidarity would be the strongest existing motivating 
power of the working class, due to its social position, its historic task, and its intellectual power. 
They also stressed a class division of solidarity, due to this particular motive in the working 
class5 (cf. Hechter (1987)). In practice, however, the working class displayed no willingness to 
realize  the  communist  targets.  This  failure  led  to  the  artificial  substitution  for  solidarity  by 
obligatory cooperation – to which the working class fatalistically resigned itself and with all the 
known consequences for the communist economies. 
 
                                                 




Polish Solidarnosz. It is a historical irony that one important voluntary social movement among 
the  communist  societies  –  the  Polish  trade  union  “Solidarnosz”  –  struggled  against  the 
communist doctrine of solidarity, the unity of state, party and working class. This movement 
showed that communist parties were not successful in representing the interests of the working 
class, and that solidarity may be target-dependent, rather than class-dependent (closely agreeing 
with  Arnsperger and Varoufakis’s (2003) definition of condition-specificity).6 The actions of 
Solidarnosz  are,  moreover,  central  in  explaining  the  roots of  the  systemic  transformation  of 
socialist into pluralist societies. 
Solidarnosz  showed  that  the  principle  power  resource  of  the  weak  was  their  collective 
mobilization into social movements. Movements based on solidarity motives have tremendous 
economic consequences: the transition of the communist into capitalist economies is nothing else 
than the dramatic switch from one set of social rules to another. It induced one of the most 
important  economic  changes  in  the  world  of  the  20th  Century  –  and  the  social  order of  an 
economic system that was based on coercive solidarity. 
 
Solidarity Wage Policy. Solidarity was also a central motivation for trade unions in capitalist 
countries  (in  particular  Sweden,  and  also  in  Central  Europe  and  the  United  States).  The 
“Solidarity Wage Policy” of the 1960’s and 1970’s was the attempt of major unions to reduce 
wage  dispersion  (inequality),  using  the  economic  power  of  well-organized  strikes7.  Wage 
inequalities were narrowed, especially in Sweden (c.f. Edin et.al. (1993)). 
The declining trend in wage inequality was broken in the mid-1980s. Wage differentials were 
widened again when right-winged governments came into legislative power in most of these 
countries. Nevertheless, the solidarity wage bargaining lasted for more than 20 years, driven by 
the egalitarian ambitions of strong and coordinated trade unions. Ultimately, however, they were 
confronted with the reproach that their wage policy was counterproductive  in general to the 
whole economy, and in particular to the less educated workers – those who should profit from 
the Solidarity Wage Policy. Many of these workers are presumed to have lost their jobs because 
their productivity increase was more than overcompensated by their wage increase. 
The success of solidarity relies on the plausibility of its objectives and its consistency with 
the consequence it yields. 
  
                                                 
6 Solidarnosz closed the gap between the narrowly defined classes, since the unity was built between the working 
class and professionals like e.g. engineers, cf. Kennedy (1991). For a historical introduction into the early years of 
this movement, c.f. Touraine et.al. (1983). 
7 For a detailed discussion on “strikes and solidarity”, esp. in England, cf. Church and Outram (1998). 6 
 
 
The Harrisburg and Chernobyl Incidents. Solidarity caused another dramatic change  in the 
German economy. Following the Harrisburg and Chernobyl incidents, weekly demonstrations 
and riots, at places where nuclear waste should be deposited, brought about the question of an 
optimal energy policy mix to the attention to the broad public. This successfully stopped the 
building of a reprocessing plant in Wackersdorf, lower Bavaria, and also prevented the further 
construction of nuclear power plants. 
An institutionalization of this movement was realized when the Green Party was founded; 
twenty years later it achieved governmental power. It is quite ironic that once elected, the party 
had much more difficulties carrying out its goal, i.e. the exit from the nuclear energy production. 
One reason may be that supporters deemed solidarity on the streets to be unnecessary, after 
the electoral success of their party in parliament. The shift of solidarity from a voluntary to 
involuntary movement led to a decrease in solidary action. 
 
Reunified Germany. Solidary feelings are challenged when people are obliged to co-operate 
through coercive tax payments or insurance in order to finance the Welfare State. Examples 
include England, France, Germany, and Scandinavia.8 After the Iron Curtain’s fall, taxpayers in 
Germany are forced to pay a Solidarity Tax, for financing the reconstruction of East German 
infrastructure. Solidarity is even used in attempts to justify why poorer countries should receive 
monetary  compensation  from  the  richer  countries  (e.g.  within  the  European  Community). 
Meanwhile, these welfare states face economic problems arising from such coercive payments. 
Those obliged to pay would rather call this solidarity “exploitation”.  
 
Pledge of supports. One may question the concept of solidarity in situations where it has neither 
economic nor political – not even personal – consequences. Innumerable solidarity addresses 
were sent to extorted workers in third world countries who even did not get to know that there 
were some fellows somewhere in Europe whose minds were full of solidarity feelings towards 
them.9  However,  people  who  did  not  contribute  to  these  solidarity  addresses  because  they 
thought them as meaningless were often attacked as uncompassionate or cynical.10  
 
B. Motivation: organizing the evidence 
When the pieces of mosaic are put together, we have a dazzling image of what solidarity could 
be. First and foremost, collective action is required for the success of a solidarity movement. 
                                                 
8 For an overview, cf. Baldwin (1990). 
9 Sometimes the evoked international solidarity was nothing else than a euphemism for the financial support of 
terrorist alliances that was organized at the same time. 




Collective action is, however, not found in any (attempted) solidarity movement. A successful 
solidarity movement must motivate a continual series of collective actions, as a means to an end. 
In other words, collective action is a necessary condition for solidarity, but it is certainly not a 
sufficient condition. A collective action must contribute to an outcome that fulfills its objective. 
Such are successful solidarity movements that bear consequences on individual and society, as 
history  shows.  In  contrast  to  the  Solidarnosz  case,  in  Western  countries,  strikes  and  wage 
policies based on solidarity failed because they led to wages disadvantageous to those who were 
supposed to benefit from this specific wage-level. Thus, volunteered solidarity sometimes has no 
consequence either, at least for those who were supposed to benefit from the solidary action. 
Also,  solidarity  movements  that  gained  administrative  power  lost  their  influence  after  their 
institutionalization. If solidarity is connected with a system of coercive payments, those who 
have to pay often feel exploited – highlighting the role of emotions in solidarity movements. It 
matters “to whom the benefit accrues to”. We delve deeper into the interaction of these elements, 
the process, and its consequences below. 
 
III  Elements of Solidarity 
A. Objectives and outcomes 
Emotions  as  motivations:  objective  and  subjective  utility.  What  induces  one  to  perform  a 
solidary action? Consider the following utility function, 
(1)    ∑ =
j
j ij i E a U , i = 1, 2, …, n,  j = 1, 2, …, n. 
Egoists have objective utility functions, i.e., with weights aii = 1 and aij = 0, for j ¹ i: they 
maximize  only  individual  income  Ei.  Altruists  have  subjective  (other-regarding)  utility 
functions11, in the symmetric case with weights aii = x and ai-i = 1 – x, for j ¹ i; they aim to 
maximize Ej: in addition to individual income, other individuals’ incomes matter.  
The public good situation is a classical case of social dilemmas. Here, a costly individual 
contribution yields a non-excludable return to every member of the group. 12 The total utility of 
such individuals may increase when they make an altruistic or a reciprocal choice, even if their 
                                                 
11 Of course it is always worthwhile to discuss if decision-makers consciously rely on their utility functions in 
making choices. If so, then one may argue that the altruistic act is no less than a self-serving instrument. Instead, one 
may see it metaphorically, as a tractable modeling tool, one that perhaps captures preferences as revealed by actions. 
We do so below. 
12 In the classical paradigm of the homo oeconomicus, self-interested individuals prefer to enjoy the benefits of the 
public good while others, not themselves, incur the costs of provision. We restrict this to cases where the worth of 
the public good to an individual is less than the cost of provision, and the returns to the public good summed over all 
individuals is worth more than the cost of provision. If all individuals reason alike, this being common knowledge, 
no contributions are made (Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)). This free-rider problem results in inefficiency, and arises 
from the (intra-group) conflict between individual and collective objectives. 8 
 
 
monetary payoff is reduced by such action. With a sufficient extent of similar motivations and 
decisions of others, monetary payoffs will also increase for all.13 In social dilemmas, altruism 
(egoism) leads to (non-)cooperation and (in-)efficiency. 
Reciprocity-motivated individuals are not described by (1), or at least not by (1) alone. They 
face  an  impact  of  another  individual’s  previous  action  on  their  utility  function.  Similar  to 
reciprocal exchanges between two persons, there is also a mutual relationship between potential 
contributors to a solidarity action. While a reciprocal relationship between two persons usually 
concerns  the  mutual  exchange  of  a  private  good  against  another,  group  cooperation  can  be 
characterized either as a contribution to a social (public) good to which some (all) potential 
contributors have access. Reciprocal feelings may arise to the extent that the decision of a person 
to contribute may depend on the contribution of others. 
Treating solidarity as a mutual exchange follows Macneil’s (1986) anthropological discourse. 
He argues that although there is a tension between individual and collective, exchange enhances 
individual utility and social solidarity. In this paper, we depart by emphasizing on the dynamic 
nature of solidarity. With this, we show the conditions under which such a process is stable and 
viable. Macneil further provides a categorization of different “types of reciprocity” in different 
classes of “primitive societies”. The mathematical argument we present allows a generalization 
of such conditions. It further offers predictions of when solidarity can be expected, varying under 
different conditions. 
An isolated solidarity action can hardly be distinguished from altruism: for donation this is 
more apparent than for cooperation because the temporal distance between giving and (possibly) 
receiving  is  larger.  Altruism  between  all  members  of  a  group  supports  solidarity  actions. 
Altruism between two members supports reciprocity.14 Nevertheless, altruism and solidarity are 
not  necessarily  the  same.  While  altruism  can  be  one-sided  (e.g.  from  parents  to  children), 
solidarity requires mutuality. In section IV we describe, by means of a dynamic process, what 
patterns of mutuality are required for solidarity. 
 
Voluntary versus involuntary contribution. Our anecdotal evidence stressed on the importance 
of  distinguishing  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  (i.e.,  coercively,  or  under  obligation) 
movements.15 Institutionalizing a solidarity movement, when its initial objectives have already 
been achieved at time t, ceases to provide an intrinsic motivation at time t + 1, i.e.  0
1 =
+ t
ij a . On 
                                                 
13 A complementary explanation is team-reasoning: individuals who identify with the group act as a profile optimal 
for the collective’s objective, instead of individual objectives (Bacharach, 1999). 
14 Kritikos and Bolle (2001) analyze and show the importance of altruism as well as reciprocity in two-person 
games. 
15 There are also hybrid forms like peer group lending where the solidarity action is connected with an incentive 
compatible  contract.  For  more  details,  cf.  Morduch  (1999)  or  Kritikos  and  Vigenina  (2005).  For  a  distinction 




the other hand, if the objective has not yet been achieved, or continual action is required to 
maintain the movement’s success, at least a proportion of individuals might remain “voluntarily” 
committed to the movement. The effect of (de-)institutionalization can be modeled simply as a 
shift of the altruistic payoff transformation, denoted by y . With  




ij a a y =
+ ,  
(de-)institutionalization bears a negative (positive) effect if  0 '< y  (> 0). Frey (1997) calls this 
the “crowding out (in) effect”. “Solidarity” is “a meaningless word in a slogan” when 0 = ij a . 
Nevertheless,  voluntary  and  involuntary  contributions  are  strongly  connected,  at  least 
fundamentally. By sufficient education, the obedience to certain collective rules may turn into 
spontaneous cooperation because educated individuals may feel morally committed to this kind 
of  cooperation  (c.f.  Etzioni  (1988)  for  moralistically  driven  action).16  Our  formal  analysis 
therefore presents the more general case of voluntary contributions to a solidarity movement.  
 
Three orders of social goods. The aim of the solidary action itself, i.e. the social good, must be 
analyzed. The social good can be one of three types.  
When the group aims to collect contributions in order to produce a productive social good it 
is called a first order social good (e.g. building a road). It should be provided if, by sufficient 
contribution, its production directly increases the utility of its users. Willingness to contribute 
increases with its efficiency. Assume that the marginal return from the social good is constant 
with increasing contributions.17 Efficiency increases with the number of contributors, and the 
amount each contributes. This can be measured in terms of utility or even monetary increase. 
Formally, let Tij, the increase of j’s income caused by i, be  ∑ + =
i
ij j j T E E . Contributing to a 
social good means Tii < 0, Tij >0. The contribution is efficient if ∑ >
j
ij T 0. 
When the group aims to redistribute scarce resources to achieve an equitable distribution, it is 
called a second order social good (e.g. social health insurance). The objective is therefore to 
decrease 
(3)    j i E E - , 
where Ei and Ej is the income of individual i and j, respectively. A second order social good 
might or might not improve efficiency. Consider the following. Let the initial incomes of i and j 
                                                 
16 For a model discussing possible influences of education on social norms, solidarity behavior and the voluntary 
adherence to collective rules, cf. Kritikos and Meran (1998) who describe how the compliance to social norms 
(which ought to correspond to the basic laws of a society) generates utility. 
17 As assumed in all experiments conducted on the private provision of a public good. For an excellent overview 
over the experiments on public goods, cf. Ledyard (1995).  10 
 
 
be  i E  and  j E , respectively. Now let  ) ( ii ij T T t = , and Tik = 0, k ¹ i, j, where τ is the transfer rate, 
i.e. each unit j receives from i is worth τ units of income. Then  ii i i T E E + = and ij j j T E E + = are 
the final incomes of i and j, respectively. Contribution to a second order social good is efficient 
when  τ  >  1,  so  Tij  >  Tii,  i.e.  welfare  improves  if  the  beneficiary’s  benefit  outweighs  the 
benefactor’s cost. When τ < 1 (= 1), there is a deterioration of (no change in) welfare. This links 
first and second order social goods.18 As an example, assume that i, a computer expert, helps j 
who is a layman. One hours help of i may save j an amount of τ = 5 hours of j’s working time. 
Also, j may help i, even with computer work, namely if i has a small income and is overloaded 
with work. In such a case, Ej – Ei as well as Ej + Ei decrease. Note that the aim to decrease |Ej – 
Ei| does not suit very well to (1): it requires a nonlinear approach such as found in Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
When  the  group  aims  to  change  a  third  party’s  uncooperative  behavior  into  cooperative 
behavior, by punishment (or threats), it is called a third order social good (e.g. a strike against 
unfair employers). For this, the utility function of contributors may contain two components. The 
first component is utility derived from a successful punishment of a third party. This leads to an 
increase of the subjective utility of its members. The second component is the expected utility 
increase when the third party’s behavior changes.19 The latter motivation results in a violation of 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis’s (2003) non-instrumentality condition, unless the utility  increase 
accrues to those other than the punishers, or punishment is conducted under anonymity. Fehr and 
Gaechter (2002) call this “altruistic punishment”. 
A third order social good further distinguishes itself from the first and second order social 
goods with the risks involved in attaining it. In the long run, credibility requires that threats, if 
necessary, be carried out (see also Bolle (1995)). It is important that actions are coordinated, for 
a successful provision of a second order public good. Moreover, political movements against 
governments, regimes or tyrants face an additional risk that is negatively correlated to the degree 
of solidarity existing among the population of a society. The less successful the movement is, 
and the less democratic the regime is, the higher the probability that members of a movement 
will be punished by the executive power of the regime. Thus, the subjective utility of solidarity-
behaving  persons  is  increased  only  with  a  certain  probability.  It  is,  therefore,  reasonable  to 
conclude that a solidarity movement is riskier if it is pointed against a third party. 
 
                                                 
18 This approach requires caution when altruism and fairness are separable motivations (c.f. Tan and Bolle, 2004). 
19 Employers may raise the wages or give employment guarantees. Governments may change their policies in 
favour of the demonstrators. Regimes may resign. Monopolists may decrease their selling prices. Producers may 




B. Actions: cooperation and donation 
We derive two different types of solidary actions, implicit in the normative descriptions from the 
existing economic literature.  
Cooperation. Solidarity may exist within a group. In social dilemmas, a group member i may 
reduce his own income (i.e. Tii < 0) in order to increase the income of group members j ¹ i by Tij 
> 0. A superior state is reached when all group members contribute, and ∑ >
j
ij T 0.20 We call 
this action “cooperation”.21 An example is participating in a strike. 
Donation. Solidarity may also exist between groups. When a member i of one (sub-)group 
reduces his own income in order to increase the income of members k of another (sub-)group by 
Tik  >  0  (perhaps  because  they  were  disadvantaged  by  Nature’s  choice).  We  call  this  act 
“donation”. An example is contributing to earthquake victims. Donations need no counter-action 
or joint attempt to increase everybody’s welfare. The counter case is “spite”, where aik < 0 and 
the effect is a decrease in k’s income Tik < 0.  
In the long run, or if we assume decisions under the veil of ignorance of one’s position in the 
world, donation is simply an aspect of cooperation (similar to Macneil’s (1986) notion of a gift). 
As we will see in section IV, donation is from the contributor’s point of view (at least for those 
who think in terms of efficiency) the limiting case of cooperation. For generality, the analysis in 
section IV defines an action simply as: a choice between taking an “action” or to “do nothing”. A 
solidary action is, after all, one that contributes to the desired net effect on social welfare. 
 
C. Group sizes, strategic and non-strategic behavior 
What are the differences between mutual exchange within a group and reciprocal one-to-one 
relations? In order to discuss this we first distinguish between small and large groups. We then 
distinguish between strategic and non-strategic behavior. 
Small  groups  characterized  by  individual  knowledge  of  one's  co-members,  and  perfect 
observability of the source of income transfers does not seem to be very different to one-to-one 
relations. This is not true if actions are anonymous, and/or have consequences for all members of 
a group. An example is the distribution of non-durable food, of which some members have an 
                                                 
20 This means at the same time that we do not have in mind aspects of solidarity which are explained as ‘multiple-
win-situation’ for all participants where contributions are or seem to be individually rational where Tii > 0, like 
within clans (cf. Ouchi, 1980). Typical examples are xenophobia (cf. Kulczycki, 1994), quotas, or public contracts 
with a loyal party (and not with the lowest cost offer) which is usually called corruption. Although we do not 
explicitly exclude in our approach all group formations which aim to restrict economic competition at the cost of 
third parties, we will not discuss this topic any further. 
21 Lindenberg (1988) asserts that poorer groups in a society are more ready to make use of the mobilization of 
solidarity movements because they have less access to public goods. 12 
 
 
oversupply. Small groups can be viewed as an intermediate case between a large group and a 
one-to-one relation. 
Anonymous relations typically characterize large groups. One might know the consequences 
of his action for the group as a whole, but one does not know how much an individual member 
gains or loses. Similarly, he might know how much he gains or loses by the action of the group 
as a whole, but he does not know the influence of an individual member.22  
If the members of a group do not consider the behavior of others, but decide on the basis of 
the present or expected state of the world, they act non-strategically. Otherwise they behave 
strategically. Non-strategic behavior is more likely as group sizes increases and observability 
decreases. For completeness, we consider both cases in section IV. The typological distinction is 
made clearer there. 
 
IV  Solidarity: A Model on Group Exchange 
A. Non-strategic behavior 
1. A small group  
If we assume that individuals behave non-strategically, solidarity is modeled as an individual 
choice problem. In all periods t = 0, 1, ..., W, individual i = 1, ..., N of a group chooses between 
two decisions: “do nothing” or “action”. The decisions determine his own income Ei as well as 
the income of others Ej; here j ≠ i. i's behavior is motivated by the objective to maximize an 







i E a U as  defined  in  (1).  aij  can  be  interpreted  as  an 
altruistic  payoff  transformation  coefficient.  1 =
t
ii a   is  a  normalization.  This  implies  the 
assumption that non-normalized 
t
ii a  are positive. 
t
ij a    0, depending on whether i feels altruistic, 
neutral, or spiteful, respectively. 
If Individual i decides to “do nothing”, the income of all individuals stay unchanged. If he 
decides to take an “action”, constant transfers Ti = Tij ( )
j=1,...,n are added to the income vector of 
the  individuals  j  =  1,  2,  …,  n.  In  general,  Ti  is  determined  ex  ante  by  a  random  process. 
Individuals decide under the knowledge of Ti. In case of small groups, we assume that Ti is 
constant,  i.e. 
t
i T   is  the  same  for  all  t.  ij T    0.  In  other  words,  positive  as  well  as  negative 
consequences are possible for all individuals. If Tii < 0 and Tij > 0, we would call this action – if 
taken – an altruistic act. (1) implies that i decides based on the value of 
                                                 
22 An important experiment on this kind of public good provision was conducted by Isaac et.a. (1994) who tested 
the willingness to contribute in large groups and found that this willingness increases as the number of participants 











i T a U ~ , 
If  0 ~ < U ,  i  will  “do  nothing”,  otherwise  he  takes  “action”  with  consequences 
t
i T ,  by  the 
condition of (subjective, other-regarding) individual rationality.23 We indicate i's decision rule as 



























A  non-strategic  kind  of  reciprocity  is  introduced  as  a  dynamic  process  which  changes  the 
coefficients aij, j ≠ i, with respect to the behavior of the other individuals. Let 
(6)    , 1
1 t






ij g d + =
+  j ≠ i 
with  1 0 < < i d  and  0 > i g . Here, the coefficient aij also accounts for depreciation and updating. 
The may be positive or negative, depending on the transfer Tji of group member j to i. Action 
made in a current time period is thus modeled as a consequence of altruistic preferences, and, by 
(6), the consequence of everybody else’s actions –in the previous periods. aij is therefore an 
endogenous variable governed by the dynamic process. Solidarity is described by (1), (4) – (6) as 
a  mutual exchange within  a group. The  motive  underlying this  mutual exchange  is dynamic 
altruism. 
 
What should we expect from this process of mutual exchange, given time? Rearranging (6), 
we get 
(7)   
1 1 1 1








ij T a a g d . 
The homogeneous equation is  





ij a a d , 
with the general solution  




ij a a d
0 = ,  
which is converging, since |d| < 1, and monotonic, since d > 0.24  
If, in a steady state, the sum from (4) is not equal to 0 for any i, then the same is true for a 
“small enough” neighborhood of the steady state. Within this neighborhood, (5) will not change 
while aij is approaching the steady state via (6). Thus, we can be sure that in a sufficiently narrow 
neighborhood of a steady state, (6) converges. For  , 0 < ii T  aij= 0 for all i,j is always a stable 
                                                 
23 Note that in the case of indifference, the action is chosen. 
24 Note that in (9), superscript t in the right hand term is a power of time, and not a time notation as usually denoted. 14 
 
 





ij a a a = =
+1  in (6), we get the particular solution  
(10)    j ji
i
i




= ,  for j ≠ i. 
Positive  transfers  evoke  positive  emotions  of  mutual  exchange  or  altruism,  and  vice  versa. 
Substituting (10) into (4) yields the steady state result. Hence, from (5), 1i = 1 requires 















(11) implies that, in the steady state, if Tij and Tji have the same sign, i.e.  ji ij T T sgn sgn = , then 
the likelihood of 1i = 1 and 1j = 1, i.e., “action” chosen by oneself and others, respectively, is 
increased;  the  converse  holds  true.  More  importantly,  for  “action”  to  be  taken,  the  sum  of 
transfer cost Tii, and the interaction between total inflows Tji and total outflows Tij, considering 
depreciation and updating, must not result in a net negative state. For positive transfers, this is 
advantageous from the point-of-view of i and j; for negative transfers, 1i = 1j = 0 would be 
socially preferred. With a lot of negative Tij, the interaction may result in a “revenge-state”, even 
if the Tii are negative (costly revenge).  
With Tii > 0 and Tij < 0 this is more like a Prisoner's Dilemma equilibrium. In the presence of 
a third party k, for example if  ji ij T T sgn sgn = , when  ik ij T T sgn sgn ¹  and  ki ji T T sgn sgn ¹ ; we 
then expect aij > 0 and aik < 0. With 1i = 1, this results in favoritism (and discrimination) towards 
j (and k). 
 
In the public good situation, Tii < 0 and Tij > 0. On the whole it is more likely that “action” 
will  be  chosen  the  more  efficient  it  is.  In  this  case,  we  may  reach  a  solidarity-state  where 
everybody sacrifices income for the improvement of the group income. However, this leads to 
the crucial question of whether the realized state is always an improvement? From an individual 
point-of-view based only on one’s own income, the inclusion of other’s income in the individual 
utility function guides behavior but is not an appropriate measure of “success”. From a social 
point-of-view,  the  sum  of  incomes  may  be  the  appropriate  valuation;  or,  we  may  take  the 
discounted sum of incomes over all future periods in order to evaluate different situations. If 










is too large, then it may happen that some or all members of the group choose “action” even 
when this is inefficient, i.e. ∑ <
j




that  case,  we  may  be  caught  in  a  (socially  inefficient)  state  with  no  “action”  even  when 
∑ >
j
ij T 0. It is impossible, however, to determine an optimal value bi ex ante and without any 
further information. For this, we consider the following example. 
 
Example A: Public goods in a small group 
Let us regard a very simple structure, namely 
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ij T T . 
This situation may be interpreted as the private supply of a public good. Efficiency requires that 
“action” is chosen if and only if 












a  is the limiting case. On the other hand, (11) requires 
(15)    ( ) 0 1 1
2 ³ - + - a b n i . 
Thus “action” and “efficiency” coincide if 










In this example, the ex ante (without knowledge of the parameter a) optimal bi depends on the 
group size. In more complex examples it will depend on the structure of the Tij and it will be 
different for different individuals i. 
 
The question  is completely different, if we do not only regard steady states but also the 
question of stability in the face of “mistakes” (made in individual decisions). It is then apparent 
that bi (in the case of generally positive Tij) should probably be larger than a static optimum such 
as (16), since a single  “mistake” (in the presence of a small di) could  induce the system to 
converge to aij = 0, a state where there  is  no preference  for altruism and,  in this  sense,  no 
solidarity emotions, even with ∑ > 0 ij T .  16 
 
 
Let  us  now  proceed  to  a  more  general  model  where  Tij  differs  from  period  to  period 
according to a random process. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume the structure of the Tij to 
be (13) and, in addition, that 






























If we could choose bi, it may again be wise to take bi > n – 1. Why? Consider the case that the 
state-of-the-world a = a occurred just once or several times in a row. It could lead to an aij so 
small that even in the case  a a = , all individuals in the group will choose to “do nothing”. The 
system then converges,  inevitably, to the state with aij = 0  for all i, j,  i.e., a world without 
solidarity.  
Such a “disaster” is avoided if bi (and, therefore, aij) is large enough so that even if  a a =  
permanently occurs the “action” will be chosen. The minimal requirement for the optimality of 








2.  A large group  
In a large group, an individual cannot distinguish between different sources of income. So, in 
order to use the above model as a description of a large group we take  
(18)    = ij a   i a  for j = 1, ... n 
(19)    . 1
1 t








+ + = g d  
Steady states are now 




ji i i T a ∑
= /
= b   
In such a steady state,  =
t
j 1 1 is connected with 
(21)    . 0 ) )( ( ³ + ∑ ∑
= / = / i j
ij
i j
ji i ii T T T b  
It is even clearer and simpler than in the case of a small group that the mutual exchange 
offers tremendous social advantages but is also connected with the danger of a “revenge-state”. 












this decision not only because I do not care but also because I aim to reduce other people's 
utility. So, even if there is a bin box in the reach of my arm I throw my waste on the street. 
However, we should usually expect  ij T  to be positive (Tii negative) and, thus, reach (nearly) 
efficient behavior. Although these are all simple structures, we can also get extremely diverse 
developments and interesting stories, if we allow  ij T  to vary stochastically in every period. 
 
B. Strategic behavior 
The first question is whether it is necessary to base decisions on interdependent utility functions 
when  behavior  is  strategic.  Can  the  members  of  a  group  simply  not  coordinate  on  efficient 
behavior? The problem then is that we might be caught in a Prisoners' Dilemma. One advantage 
of non-zero aij is the commitment that is incorporated in such a valuation.  
There is another even more important question. Above we described short-term preferences. 
What are the long-term preferences that guide behavior in such a situation? We easily enter 
discussions about second order preferences (Sen (1977), Bolle (1983, 1991)). 
For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  we  therefore  adopt  the  “doer-planner”  model  of  Thaler  and 
Shefrin (1981). In this model, the doer decides on “action” or “do nothing” on the basis of short-
term preferences such as (4). The planner can shape preferences described by aij and desires to 
maximize the discounted income of the individual. He has only internal means at his disposal, 
for example, he may be able to increase or decrease aij in every period by an arbitrary amount 
Daij with 
(22)    e e < D < - ij a . 
Such a device gives Frank's [1987] hypothetical question, “if homo oeconomicus could choose 
his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience?” a concrete meaning. 
An instrument like this might make it possible to leave a sub-optimal steady state of aij by the 
joint decision of some of the group members to increase their aij. Then the rest of the group may 
be forced into altruism or reciprocity by process (7). And if all contribute we may arrive at a 
socially advantageous state that no member can leave, even if he chooses Daij e - = . 
 
V   Conclusion 
We distinguished between voluntary and coercive contribution to a solidarity movement as well 
as between donation and cooperation. As we saw in section II and III, the most puzzling piece of 
solidarity movements is when cooperation is to be “organized” voluntarily. It is basically this 
kind of solidarity action that provokes deeper thought. With respect to voluntary cooperation we 18 
 
 
showed that there are different orders of social goods, which may be (aimed to be) provided by a 
“coordinated” solidarity movement. They influence the willingness to contribute to a solidarity 
action. Each order of social good is connected with different risks and utility assessments that 
basically influence the decision of whether or not to contribute to a solidarity action. 
In  section  IV  we  analyzed  how  a  process  of  mutual  beneficial  actions  is  enhanced,  for 
example when a public good is supposed to be provided by a group that is tied together by 
solidarity feelings. We assumed that these feelings are expressed in a dynamic utility function by 
an additional term proportional to the income of others. In the long run, the average income 
transfers due to the (beneficial) actions of others determines the strength of this term. These are 
captured in the following two quotes, 
“… the larger part of the great inventions tend to increase these relations of mutual 
dependence which exist between men, and make them vibrate throughout the universe 
in the community of the same emotions.” Gide (1987), and 
“It  compels  to  our  attention  to  all  that  happens  to  our  fellow-creatures,  whether 
fortunate or not, since all that concerns them concerns us.” Gide (1987) 
One “dark side” of this usually beneficial process is that, under unfortunate circumstances, it 
may result in an inefficient revenge state. But under many (or most) scenarios, we can expect 
that  the  dynamic  process  can  enhance  efficiency.  In  certain  situations,  it  even  implies 
punishment for socially unwarranted behavior. 
We certainly have not touched all aspects of solidarity in our paper. Based on our discussion, 
a number of further issues – as puzzling as those mentioned in section II – can be raised. Let us 
mention only two examples, namely the normative aspect of solidarity, and a dangerous measure 
to develop solidarity feelings. The normative point of view of solidarity movements touches the 
conflict of why a certain target of a movement is a “good” target which is here implicitly set 
equal to an efficiency increase and why the present situation is “bad”. This brings into attention 
that there are sometimes subjectively good targets which tie together a group to a solidarity 
movement,  against  a  subjectively  badly-behaving  third  party;  it  then  depends  on  one’s  own 
point-of-view of whether a movement increases welfare.  
There are more problems. Coordination is important, in particular in fighting a third party. 
One solution to the problem of coordination is that leadership, however, also has an ugly face. 
The producers of the film On the Waterfront launched the film as a story that shows how ‘self-
appointed  tyrants  can  be  defeated  by  right-thinking  people  in  a  vital  democracy’.  Anderson 
[1955, 71f.] asserts that  
“The conception ... seems to be implicitly (if unconsciously) Fascist: Friendly´s [the 
old  master´s] hold  is  broken. The dockers have  it in their power to be their own 




search of a new master. ‘If Terry walks in, we walk in with him’. If there is any 
principle expounded here, it is surely not that of Democracy. The people collectively 
are shown as incapable of either self-government or mutual aid.” 
There are not only solidarity movements which turned the set of social rules from hierarchic 
to democratic rules but also the other way round. This shows that the third party is not always an 
autocratic regime (as mentioned in the introduction) but has historically often been wealthier but 
weaker minorities (like the Jews in pre-war Germany or the Armenians in Turkey).25 
It is a well-established fact that an action against a common enemy (which we neutrally 
called the third party) can strengthen the ties of a solidarity movement. 26  Thus the invention of 
enemies may become a political instrument. This is a paradoxical measure: solidarity towards 
part of the society is sacrificed in order to strengthen the solidarity feelings of the rest.27 
Above all, the State can be regarded as the highest form of social solidarity. Within the social 
contract between the State and its citizens,  
“Solidarity will gain a high moral value when it is understood, accepted, and desired 
by men, when it becomes the basis of duty, and when men endeavor to realize freely 
that  moral  good  will  be  the  desire  to  be  and  behave  as  members  of  a  common 
humanity” (Gide (1987)).  
In the course of evolution, the adherence to the collective rules of a society by the vast majority 
of its citizens has become a spontaneous order.28 It is the main prerequisite for building effective 
market  and  non-market  institutions  allowing  societies  to  realize  a  high  level  of  economic 
development. 
                                                 
25  Of  course  also  these  movements  were  able  to  realize  an  increase  of  their  objective  utility  by  illegally 
redistributing the property of the persecuted wealthy minority. 
26 Tan and Zizzo (2003) discuss mechanisms that induce in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. 
27 With that we would enter the discussion on the psychology of the masses which contains more aspects than 
raised here. For an excellent introduction into this theme cf. Le Bon (1895) who claimed that such movements 
adhere to the law of the mental unit of the masses (loi de l´unité mentale des foules) so that from a certain point the 
mere participation in such a group may already lead to an increase of utility. 
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